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ABSTRACT 
Possibilistic logic, an extension of first-order logic, deals with uncertainty that can be 
estimated in terms of possibility and necessity measures. Syntactically, this means that a 
first-order formula is equipped with a possibility degree or a necessity degree that 
expresses to what extent he formula is possibly or necessarily true. Possibilistic resolu- 
tion yields a calculus for possibilistic logic which respects the semantics developed for 
possibilistic logic. A drawback, which possibilistic resolution inherits from classical 
resolution, is that it may not terminate if applied to formulas belonging to decidable 
fragments of first-order logic. Therefore we propose an alternative proof method for 
possibilistic logic. The main feature of this method is that it completely abstracts from a 
concrete calculus but uses as basic operation a test for classical entailment. We then 
instantiate possibilistic logic with a terminological logic, which is a decidable subclass of 
first-order logic but nevertheless much more expressive than propositional logic. This 
yields an extension of terminological logics towards the representation of uncertain 
knowledge which is satisfactory from a semantic as well as algorithmic point of view. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There have been many proposals for the treatment of uncertainty in 
artificial intelligence, in particular for expert systems and knowledge 
representation systems (for an overview see, e.g., [18, 14]). If uncertainty 
can be estimated in terms of possibility and necessity measures (as used in 
the framework of possibility theory [24]), possibilistic logic is a promising 
candidate. In fact, a basic feature of possibilistic logic is its ability to model 
states of knowledge ranging from complete information to total ignorance 
by expressing lower bounds for the possibility or necessity of some piece of 
knowledge. This allows, for instance, to distinguish between the total lack 
of certainty in the truth of a proposition and the certainty that the 
proposition is false. 
From a syntactical point of view, possibilistic logic employs closed 
first-order formulas which are equipped with a possibility degree or a 
necessity degree: A weight Ha  (Na)  attached to a formula p models to 
what extent p is possibly (necessarily) true, where a ranges between 0 and 
1. To express, for example, that p is likely to be true, one may use the 
necessity-valued formula (p, N0.7), whereas one may write (p, 170.9) to 
model that p is to a high degree possible, but not certain at all. 
Recently, a semantics for possibilistic logic has been presented for the 
general case where possibility- as well as necessity-valued formulas are 
allowed (cf. [15]). The semantics is based on fuzzy sets of interpretations, 
i.e., to each classical interpretation to of the language associated with the 
first-order formulas occurring in a set of possibilistic formulas a value 
~'(to) between 0 and 1 is assigned. Intuitively, the value it(to) indicates 
how likely it is that to is the real world. Every fuzzy set of interpretations 
induces two functions, denoted by II and N, which determine the possibil- 
ity and the necessity of a formula p as follows: 
I I (p)  = sup(~r(to)lto ~p)  and N(p)  = 1 - I I (~p) .  
A fuzzy set of interpretations satisfies a possibilistic formula (p, Ha)  iff 
I I (p) > a, and it satisfies (p, Na)  iff N(p)>_ a. Entailment is then 
straightforwardly defined as follows: A possibilistic formula 4~ is a logical 
consequence of a possibilistic knowledge base qb (i.e., a set of possibilistic 
formulas) iff every fuzzy set of interpretations satisfying each element in 
also satisfies th. 
The entailment of a possibilistic formula from a possibilistic knowledge 
base can be checked mechanically on the basis of possibilistic resolution-- 
an extension of the well-known resolution principle to possibilistic logic-- 
which has been introduced in [8]. If applications of the possibilistic 
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resolution rule to qb U {(~ p, N1)} yield a derivation of an empty possi- 
bilistic clause (rn,v) then qb entails (p, v), where v is either Ha  or Na 
for some a ~ [0, 1], 
A drawback which possibilistic resolution inherits from classical resolu- 
tion is that it may not terminate if applied to formulas belonging to 
decidable fragments of first-order logic. In fact, if the input formulas 
contain existential quantifiers in the scope of universal quantifiers, the 
(Skolem) function symbols that result from transforming these formulas 
into clause form may cause nontermination of standard resolution (and 
thus possibilistic resolution). 1 Moreover, the transformation f possibilistic 
formulas into clause form yields another problem: A set of possibility-val- 
ued formulas cannot always be transformed into an "equivalent" set of 
clauses--not even for the propositional case (cf. [15, Section 3.1]). 
For these reasons we propose an alternative proof method for possibilis- 
tic logic. The main feature of this method is that it completely abstracts 
from a concrete calculus (such as the resolution or tableau calculus), and 
instead uses as basic operation a test for classical entailment. If this test is 
effective for a given fragment of first-order logic, we show that possibilistic 
reasoning is also decidable for this fragment. Additionally, if one has an 
algorithm that solves the entailment problem, our proof method automati- 
cally yields an algorithm realizing possibilistic entailment. We prove that 
the proposed method is sound and complete (for the general case where 
both possibility- and necessity-valued formulas are allowed) with respect o 
the semantics of possibilistic logic. 
We then show how our method can be utilized to obtain decision 
procedures for a possibilistic extension of terminological knowledge repre- 
sentation formalisms, also called terminological logics. These formalisms, 
which are employed in terminological representation systems uch as BACK 
[19], CLASSIC [4], KRIS [2], or LOOM [16], are in general decidable fragments 
of first-order logic (see, e.g., [6, 5]). 2 Although restricted, terminological 
logics are nevertheless expressive nough to define the relevant concepts 
of a problem domain. This is done by building complex concepts from 
primitive concepts (unary predicates) and roles (binary predicates) with the 
help of operations provided by the concept language of the particular 
formalism. For example, if we assume that person  and car  are concepts 
and that owns  is a role, the concept 
person I-] qowns .car  
lit should be noted that the resolution calculus can be modified so that it yields decision 
procedures for various decidable fragments of first-order logic (see e.g. [21]). However, it is 
not yet clear whether or not this approach can be extended tothe possibilistic case. 
2Undecidable terminological l nguages have been identified in[20, 17]. 
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describes the set of all persons having some car. Additionally, objects (or 
individuals) can be introduced by stating that an object is instance of a 
concept (e.g., Tom : person) ,  or that two objects are related by a role (e.g., 
(Tom, car_7): owns). 
Several approaches have already been proposed to enhance the expres- 
sivity of terminological formalisms with (some form of) uncertainty (e.g., 
probabilistic implications between concepts [10], probabilistic terminologi- 
cal axioms together with probabilistic assertions [13], or subsumption 
between fuzzy concepts [22]). The approach that comes nearest o ours is 
described in [23]. It outlines an architecture for incorporating approximate 
reasoning into terminological systems. The main problem of this approach, 
however, is that its behavior is only described informally, i.e., neither a 
complete semantics nor algorithms for the main inference problems are 
presented. 
An extension of terminological formalisms towards the representation f 
uncertain knowledge which is satisfactory both from a semantic and from 
an algorithmic point of view can be obtained by instantiating possibilistic 
logic with a terminological logic. This means that we do not allow arbitrary 
first-order formulas in possibilistic formulas, but only those which can be 
formed by a particular terminological formalism. To be more precise, in 
the possibilistic extension we present one can, on the one hand, state 
plausible rules between concepts. For example, the rule 
(person ~ rich ~ 3owns.Porsche, [10.7) 
expresses that "rich persons are likely to own a Porsche." Of course, 
universally valid rules, i.e., strict implications between concepts uch as 
"every Porsche is a car," can be formulated by using the maximal necessity 
value N1. On the other hand, one can express uncertain knowledge 
concerning particular objects by adding possibility or necessity values to 
formulas expressing concept and role instanceships. 
This approach as not only the advantage of being semantically sound. 
It also provides one with decision procedures for the basic inference 
problems (e.g., possibilistic entailment) which are sound and complete with 
respect o the semantics for possibilistic logic. These decision procedures 
can immediately be obtained by instantiating our proof method with 
inference algorithms for terminological logics, which have, for example, 
been described in [5, 1]. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce syntax and 
semantics of possibilistic logic. The alternative proof method and the proof 
of its soundness and completeness are given in Section 3. Finally, in 
Section 4, we propose a possibilistic extension of terminological logics. 
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2. POSSIBILISTIC LOGIC 
This section reviews possibilistic logic) We start with introducing the 
syntax for possibilistic formulas, and then we recapitulate the semantics for 
possibilistic logic as defined in [15]. Finally, possibilistic resolution, a proof 
calculus for possibilistic logic, is presented. 
DEFINITION 2.1 (Possibilistic formula, possibilistic knowledge base) A 
possibilistic formula is either a pair (p, Ha)  or (p, Na)  where p is a 
closed first-order formula and a ~ [0, 1] is a real number. A finite set of 
possibilistic formulas is called a possibilistic knowledge base. 
Intuitively, a possibility-valued formula (p, Ha)  [a necessity-valued for- 
mula (p, Na)]  expresses that p is possibly [necessarily] true at least to 
degree a. As already mentioned, the formal meaning of possibilistic 
formulas is defined in terms of fuzzy sets of interpretations. This means 
that to each (classical) interpretation to of the language associated with 
the first-order formulas occurring in a possibilistic knowledge base a value 
7r(to) between 0 and 1 is assigned. This value indicates how likely it is that 
to is the real world. 
DEFINITION 2.2 (Possibility distribution) Let ~ be the set of interpreta- 
tions of a first-order language. A possibility distribution 7r on f~ is a 
mapping from fl  to [0, 1] such that 7r(to) = 1 for some to ~ [1. 
Note that the normalization requirement, i.e., ~-(to) = 1 for some to E 
[1, guarantees that there is a world which is possibly the real one. 
Every possibility distribution 7r on f~ induces two functions, denoted by 
H' and N', mapping (first-order) formulas to [0, 1]. These functions, called 
possibility measure and necessity measure, are defined as follows. 
DEFINITION 2.3 (Possibility measure II' and necessity measure N') Let 
7r be a possibility distribution on a set ~ of interpretations. The function II' 
defined by 
I F (p )  = sup{~-(to)lto ~ fl and to ~p} 
is called possibility measure, and the function N' defined by 
N' (p)  = inf{1 - ~'(to)lto ~ f~ and oJ W:p} 
is called necessity measure, where sup{ } := 0 and inf{ } := 1. 
3For a more thorough introduction consult [7]. 
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Thus, if IF(p) = a, there is an interpretation to such that o9 ~ p and 
7r(o9) = a, or there is an infinite sequence o90, °91, o92 . . . .  of interpreta- 
tions such that ogi ~P ,  7r(09i) < "/r(ogi+l), and a is the least upper bound 
of {zr(og0), ~r(o91), 7r(o9 2) . . . .  }. On the other hand, if N'(p) = a then for 
all o9 such that to ~ p we have 7r(o9) < 1 - a. 
An immediate consequence of this definition is 
I I ' (p  v q) = max{II'(p), Ir(q)} and 
I I ' (p /x  q) _< min{rr(p) ,  II'(q)}, (1) 
which in fact shows that the possibility measure is in accordance with the 
basic axioms of possibility theory (cf. [24]). Moreover, by duality of the 
measures II' and N', i.e., IF(p) = 1 - N ' (~ p), we have for the necessity 
measure 
N' (p  A q) = min{N'(p),  N'(q)} and 
N' (p  v q) > max{N'(p),  N'(q)}. (2) 
If a (first-order) formula p ~ q is valid, i.e. {p} ~ q, it is easy to verify that 
IF (p)  < II '(q) and N' (p)  < N'(q); (3) 
furthermore II'(-I-) = N'(q-) = 1 for any tautology T ,  and II'(_1_) = 
N'(_L) = 0 for any inconsistent formula _1_ (which is due to the normal- 
ization constraint). 
In the following we formally define the notion of entailment in possi- 
bilistic logic: When is a given possibilistic formula logical consequence of a 
possibilistic knowledge base? This consequence r lationship is defined with 
respect o possibility distributions as follows. 
DEFINITION 2.4 (Possibilistic entailment) A possibility distribution ~r on 
a set II of  interpretations satisfies a possibilisticformula (p,  Ha),  written 
as 1r~(p ,  Ha) ,  iff II '(p)>_ a, and it satisfies (p, Na), written as 
7r ~ (p, Na), iff N'(p) >_ a. A possibility distribution 7r on l-I satisfies a 
possibilistic knowledge base dp iff 7r ~ qb for all qb c dp. Fina#y, we say that 
a possibilistic formula c k is entailed by a possibilistic knowledge base ~,  
denoted by dp ~ oh, iff ~ ~ ~b for all 7r such that 7r ~ dp holds. 
Let us consider an example. Assume that the possibilistic knowledge 
base • is given by {(p, N0.8), (p ~ q, N0.4), (q--> r, I10.7)}. Then qb 
entails the formula (r, 110.7). 
To see this, let ~" be a possibility distribution satisfying ~. We first 
observe that 7r ~ (q, N0.4). In fact, since {p, p ---> q} ~ q, we conclude 
N'(q) _ N ' (p  A (p ~ q)) = min{N'(p), N ' (p  -~ q)} >_ 0.4. 
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Duality gives us II'(-~ q) < 0.6. Furthermore, note that 
0.7 < II '(q ~ r) = I I ' (~  q v r) = max{W(-~ q), H'(r)}. 
Since II'(--, q) < 0.6, we can conclude that I I '(r) > 0.7. This shows that ~- 
satisfies (r, 1-I0.7). 
There are possibilistic knowledge bases which are not satisfied by any 
possibilistic distribution. For example, if dO contains both (p, N0.7) and 
(-~ p, N0.4), one gets II'(-n p) = sup{~-(~o) I o)~ ~p} < 0.3 and I I ' (p) = 
sup(~-(oJ) I o~ ~ p} _< 0.6 for every possibility distribution 7r. But this means 
that 7r(w) < 0.6 for every oJ, which shows that the normalization require- 
ment, i.e., 7r(o))= 1 for some w, is not satisfied. Thus dO cannot be 
satisfied by any possibilistic distribution. This, of course, means that euery 
possibilistic formula is entailed by dO. However, the fact that we have more 
confidence in the truth of p than in the truth of ~ p is not taken into 
account by the semantics just described. 
In order to achieve this behavior, i.e., to block the entailment of a 
possibilistic formula from an "inconsistent" possibilistic knowledge base, 
we need the notion of an absurd interpretation, i.e., an "interpretation" 
that satisfies every first-order formula. To define this notion, we (tempor- 
arily) view an interpretation o~ as a function that maps a first-order 
formula p to an element of the set {0, 1} such that ~o(p) = 1 if w ~ p and 
w(p) = 0 if o) ~e p. 
DEFINITION 2.5 (Absurd interpretation) The function that maps every 
formula p to 1 is called the absurd interpretation and is denoted by oJ ± , 
i.e., o) l (p )  = 1 for all formulas p. By abuse of  notation, we simply write 
o) ± ~ p iff o) ± ( p)  = 1. 
DEFINITION 2.6 (Possibility measure II and necessity measure N) Let 
be a set of  (classical) interpretation, and let w± be the absurd 
interpretation. A possibility distribution is now a mapping from 12 ~ := f~ u 
{o)z} to [0,1] such that ~r( o) ) = 1 for some o) ~ f~ ± . The possibility 
measure II and necessity measure N induced by a possibility distribution 
7r on ~ l are defined by 
• I I (p)  = sup{~r(o)) I ~o c f~. and w ~p} and 
• N(p) = inf{1 - 7r(w)] w ~ 12± and o) ~p} 
where p is a first-order formula. 
Observe that I I (p )= max{II'(p), 7r(w±)} and N(p)= N'(p), which 
means that the duality between II and N can be expressed by 
I I (p )  = max{1 - N(~ p),  7r(o~±)}. 
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Furthermore, it can easily be verified that the defined possibility and 
necessity measures atisfy the basic axioms of possibility theory, i.e., the 
equations and inequations (1), (2), and (3) hold if H' (N') is replaced by 17 
(N). Furthermore, we observe that 17(T) = N(T) = 1 for any tautology 
T ,  and N(_t_) = 0, but in general I I (2 )  ~ 0 for any inconsistent formula 
_L. 
Satisfaction and entailment are defined as before (cf. Definition 2.4) 
except that we now consider possibility distributions on f~l (instead of 
O). 
In [15] it has already been mentioned that both semantics coincide for 
possibilistic knowledge bases that are "consistent." To be more precise, 
suppose that there is a possibilistic distribution ~- on 12 satisfying qb. Then 
~b is entailed by qb according to the first semantics if and only if ~b is 
entailed by @ according to the modified, inconsistency tolerant semantics. 
Of course, both semantics differ in the case where qb is inconsistent. 
Recall that ~ given by {(p, N0.7), (7  p, N0.4)} entails every possibilistic 
formula according to the first semantics. However, according to the incon- 
sistency tolerant semantics we have qb ~ (p, N0.7) and • ~ (~ p, N0.4), 
but • ~ (p, Na)  for a > 0.7 and • ~ (-~ p, Na' )  for a'  > 0.4. This shows 
that one can no longer derive any possibilistic formula from an inconsis- 
tent possibilistic knowledge base. 
A possibilistic knowledge base that is inconsistent according to the first 
semantics is more or less inconsistent according to the inconsistency toler- 
ant semantics. For example, {(p, Na) , (~ p, Na)} should be considered 
more inconsistent than {(p,N/3),(~p,N/3)} if a > /3. To measure the 
strength of inconsistency the following definition has been introduced in 
[151. 
DEFINITION 2.7 (Inconsistency degree) The consistency degree of  a 
possibilistic knowledge base rb, Incons(  @ ), is defined as follows: 
• I f  there is a possibility distribution ~r on 12 ± such that 7r ~ d~ and 
7r(o)) = 1 for  some ~o ~ 12, then @ is possibly inconsistent and 
Incons(~)  = Ha ,  where a = infbr(~o.)  I 7r ~ ,I,}. I f lncons(~)  = 
110 we say that • is completely consistent. 
• I f  for  allpossibility distributions 7r on f~± , 7r ~ rb implies 7r(o)) < 1 
for  every o) ~ Ft, then dp is necessarily inconsistent and Incons(  ~ ) 
= Na ,  where a = inf{1 - ~r(o)) I ~o ~ ~ and Tr ~ alp}. 
Note that I ncons(~)  = [I a implies 0 < a < 1 and Incons(dp) = Na  
implies 0 < a _< 1. 
To illustrate this definition let us consider some examples. An example 
for a completely consistent knowledge base is given in the previous exam- 
ple, i.e., dp = {(p, N0.8), (p -* q, N0.4), (q ~ r, II0.7)}. In fact, it is easy to 
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verify that the possibility distribution ~r defined by 
0 if to=to±,  
7r(to) = 0.2 if to ~:p,  
0.6 if to~p~q,  
1 otherwise 
satisfies every formula in dO. 
To determine the inconsistency degree of dOl = {(p, Not ) , (~  p, 1I/3)} 
we construct an appropr iate possibility distribution 7r on 12± satisfying 
dO1. If  7r ~ dO1, then 7r(to) < 1 - a for every interpretation to with to ~:p 
[because N(p)  = 1 - sup{~-(to) I to e f~± and to ~p} > a]. First assume 
that a +/3  < 1. We observe that the possibility distribution defined by 
i if to~ ~p,  
7r(to) = if to ~p,  
if to = to± 
satisfies dOl. In fact, N(p)  = 1 - sup{rr(to) I to ~ ~ and to ~:p} = 1 - /3  
> a and I I ( -~p)  = sup{zr(to) I to ~ ~± and to ~ -~p} >/3 ,  which shows 
that ~- ~ dO1. Thus dO1 is completely consistent if a +/3  < 1. 
Now assume that a +/3  > 1. Recall that 7r(to) < 1 - a for every to 
with to ~ p, which shows that sup{Tr(to) [ to ~ 12 • and to ~ p} </3  (since 
1 - a </3) .  But this means that 7r(to±) >/3  for all 7r satisfying dO1, 
because 11(-7 p)  = max{II '(-7 p),  ~-(to •)} > /3. Since the possibility distri- 
bution defined by 
i if to ~ ~p,  
~-(to) = - a if to ~:p,  
if to = to± 
satisfies dO1, dO1 is possibly inconsistent and Incons( do 1) = 1][3. 
An example for a necessarily inconsistent possibilistic knowledge base is 
dO2 = {(p, Na) , (=p,N/3)}  where a > 0 and /3 > 0. It can easily be 
checked that Incons(dO e) = N min{a,/3}. 
DEFINITION 2.8 (Ordering on inconsistency degrees) The total ordering 
on the inconsistency degrees is defined by 
• I Ia>I Ia ' i f f l>a>a' ,  
• Not >_ Nee' iffot > a '  > O, and 
• Not >_ Hot' iffot > 0 and or' < 1. 
Thus we have that Incons(dO) >_ 11or [Incons(dO) >_ Not] implies In- 
cons(dO) >_ Hot' [Incons(dO) > Na' ]  if ot > or'. Furthermore,  Incons(dO) 
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> Na implies Incons(~) > II a' if a > 0 and a' < 1. This definition is 
justified by the fact that if • is necessarily inconsistent, hen 7r(~o±) = 1 
for all ~- satisfying alp. But this means that 1 = inf{Tr(oJ ±) [ ~r ~ qb} > a 
for any inconsistency degree II a (cf. Definition 2.7). Finally note that we 
do not order the valuations II1 and NO, as they are not inconsistency 
degrees. 
The following proposition, which has been proved in [15], shows that the 
entailment problem in possibilistic logic can be reduced to the problem of 
determining the inconsistency degree of a possibilistic knowledge base, and 
vice versa. 
PROPOSITION 2.9 (Lang, Dubois, and Prade) Let ¢b be a possibilistic 
knowledge base. Then: 
• qb ~ (p, I I a )  i ff lncons(~ U {(~ p, N1)}) _ Ha ,  
. qb ~ (p, Na)  ifflncons(dP U {(-~ p, N1)}) > Na. 
In order to determine (lower bounds for) the inconsistency degree of a 
possibilistic knowledge base, the resolution principle has been extended so 
that it can be applied to possibilistic formulas (see, e.g., [8, 15]). Let (c, v) 
and (c', v') be possibilistic formulas, where c, c' are first-order formulas in 
clause form and v, v' are possibility or necessity degrees. The possibilistic 
resolution rule allows the derivation of a possibilistic formula (res(c, c'), 
v o v'), where res(c, c') is a classical resolvent of c, c', and o is defined by 
Na oNe' = Nmin{a,  a'}, 
Na° I Ia '=F la ' °Na=(  II°dIIO else, if a+a '> l ,  
I I a  o I Ia '  = II0. 
We notice that if a derived formula has the possibility degree II0, the 
formula does not carry any additional information and can therefore be 
discarded. This means in particular that the resolution rule need not be 
applied to two possibility-valued clauses. 
If applications of the rule yield a derivation of an empty possibilistic 
clause (D, w) from a set • of possibilistic lauses, a lower bound for the 
inconsistency degree of cI) is given by w, i.e., Incons(dP) >_ w (cf. [15]). 
To illustrate the possibilistic resolution principle let us review the 
possibilistic knowledge base • = {(p, N0.8), (-1 p v q, N0.4), (-~ q v 
r, II0.7)} of a previous example. In order to show that • ~ (r, II0.7) one 
starts with d~ u {(-~ r, N1)}. Then.possibilistic resolution yields the deriva- 
tion of the empty possibilistic clause (Figure 1). Since Incons(~ u 
{(--1 r, N1)}) >_ II0.7, we can in fact conclude that (r, II0.7) is entailed by 
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(p, N0.8) (-~p V q, N0.4) 
(q, N0.4) (--q V r, H0.7) 
(r, II0.7) ('~r, N1) 
(a, no.7) 
Figure 1. 
In [15] it has been shown that possibilistic resolution is sound and 
complete in the following sense: Let ep be a set of possibility- and 
necessity-valued propositional clauses, or a set of necessity-valued first- 
order clauses. Then I ncons(ep)  > v iff there is a derivation of an empty 
possibilistic clause (D, u) from • by applications of the possibilistic 
resolution rule. 
Although possibilistic resolution has this nice property, the overall 
calculus, i.e., transforming arbitrary possibilistic formulas into clause form 
and then applying the possibilistic resolution rule, has some drawbacks. In 
the presence of possibility-valued formulas it is in general not possible to 
transform a set of possibilistic formulas into a set of possibilistic lauses 
which have the same inconsistency degree (see [15, Section 3.1]). Also, 
standard resolution may not terminate, even if applied to decidable frag- 
ments of first-order logic. This, of course, means that possibilistic resolu- 
tion does in general not yield a decision procedure for a possibilistic 
extension of terminological logics. 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE PROOF METHOD FOR POSSIBILISTIC 
LOGIC 
This section describes an alternative method for solving the entailment 
problem in possibilistic logic and for determining the inconsistency degree 
of a possibilistic knowledge base. The main feature of this method is that it 
completely abstracts from a concrete calculus, but uses as basic operation 
a test for classical entailment. If this test is effective for a given fragment 
of first-order logic, we will see that possibilistic reasoning is also decidable 
for this fragment. 
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In the following we assume that the possibility and necessity degrees of 
a possibilistic formula are not equal to zero. This assumption is justified by 
the fact that by definition II(p) > 0 and N(p) >_ 0 hold, which shows that 
every possibility distribution satisfies formulas of the form (p, 1710) or 
(p, NO). Hence such formulas do not carry any additional information and 
can therefore be discarded from possibilistic knowledge bases. 
DEFINITION 3.1 (Notation: @4 and ~)  Let • be a possibilistic knowl- 
edge base and let a ~ [0, 1]. We denote by ~ ( ~)  the first-order formulas 
of necessity-valued formulas in • that haue a ualue greater (strictly greater) 
than a, i.e., 
• qb :={p l (p ,  Na ' )e@,  a'_> a}, 
• qb ~:={p l (p ,Na ' )~,  a '> a}. 
These abbreviations are quite useful in giving an alternative characteri- 
zation of possibilistic entailment. Let qb be a possibilistic knowledge base, 
let p be a first-order formula, and let 0 < a < 1. In the following we will 
show that 
• qb ~ (p, Na)  iff ~ ~p,4 
• qb~(p ,  Ha)  iff 
~0 ~p or 
there is some (q, 1I/3) ~ qb such that /3 > a and ~1-~ u {q} ~p.  
This means that (p, No~) is entailed by • iff the first-order formulas of 
necessity-valued formulas in qb whose value is not less than a classically 
entail p. For possibility-valued formulas the situation is slightly more 
complex: (p, I I a )  is a possibilistic onsequence of • iff (1) the first-order 
formulas of necessity-valued formulas in qb classically entail p, or (2) there 
is a possibility-valued formula (q, II/3), /3 > a, in qb such that q together 
with the first-order formulas of necessity-valued formulas in ~ whose 
value is strictly greater than 1 - /3  yield a classical proof for p. 
Let us now show the soundness of the alternative proof method, i.e. the 
"iff' part of the above claims. 
LEMMA 3.2 (Soundness for necessity-valued formulas) Let ap be a 
possibilistic knowledge base, and let ( p, Na)  be a possibilistie formula with 
a > O. I f  ~ ~p then • ~ (p, Na). 
Proof If ~ ,  ~ p, there is a subset {(Pl, Nal ) , - - . ,  (P,, Nan)} of • such 
that {Pl , ' ' ' ,Pn} ~p and a ~< Ot i for all i, 1 < i < n. Hence a < 
min{a~ . . . . .  a,}. Let rr be a possibility distribution on f l± such that 
4In [7], this fact has already been mentioned for the restricted case where only necessity- 
valued formulas are allowed. In the following we will verify that his relationship also holds if 
contains both necessity- and possibility-valued formulas. 
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7r ~ qb. We show that 7r satisfies (p ,  Na) .  Observe that N(pi)  > a i for all 
i, 1 < i < n [because (Pi, Nai )  ~ ~].  Since {P l , . . - ,  Pn} ~ P, the formula 
Pl m ... A Pn ~ P is valid, which shows that 
N(p)  > N(p l  A ... Apn)  = min{N(p l ) , . . . ,N (pn)}  
>_ min{a 1 . . . . .  o~n} > oz. 
Thus we have N(p)  >_ a,  and ~r satisfies (p,  Na) .  • 
LEMMA 3.3 (Soundness for possibility-valued formulas) Let • be a 
possibilistic knowledge base, and let ( p, II a ) be a possibilistic formula with 
a > O. I f  ~o ~p or there is some (q, l J /3) ~ • such that [3 >_ a and 
qb l-t~ U {q} ~p,  then • ~ (p ,  Ha) .  
Proof  Assume that ~0 ~ p. There is a subset {(Pl, Na l )  . . . . .  (P , ,  Nan)} 
of ~ such that {Pl . . . .  , P,} ~ P and min{a l , . . . ,  a n} > 0. This shows that 
N(p)  > 0. Thus, if 7r is a possibility distribution satisfying q~, we can 
conclude that for all w ~ 12±, w~p implies 7r(o~)< 1. Because of 
the normalization requirement here is an interpretation w' such that 
7r(oY) = 1. Since w' ~ p, it follows that 17(p) = 1, and hence 7r ~ (p ,  H a).  
Thus we can conclude that • ~ (p ,  Ha) .  
Now assume that there is some (q, 1713) ~ • such that [3 > a and 
~ l -~ U {q} Pp .  Thus there is a subset {(p l ,Na l ) , . . . , (p , ,Nan)}  of 
such that (Pl  . . . . .  Pn, q) ~P  and a i > 1 - /3  for all i, 1 < i < n. Let 7r be 
a possibility distribution on 1~ _ such that 7r ~ qb. We show that ~r satisfies 
(p ,  Ha) .  Let us recall that 
H(q)  = max{17 ' (q ) ,w(wi )}  > /3 >- a .  
Case 1." I I (q)  = 7r(wi ) .  Then l ] (p )  = sup{Tr(w)[ w ~ f~± and w 
p} > 7r(~o±) > a,  which shows that 7r satisfies (p ,  Ha) .  
Case 2." 17(q) =~ ¢r(~o L). Hence we have I I (q)  = I I ' (q).  First we show 
that H ' (q  A p~ A ... A Pn) >-/3. Observe that 
/3 < I I ' (q )  
= H ' ( (q  Ap l  A ... Ap , )  v (q A ~(P l  A ... Apn) ) )  
= I I ' ( (qAp~ A ' "Apn)  V(qA ~pm) V""  V(qA ~p, ) )  
= max{17'(q Ap~ A ... Apn) ,  H' (q  A -~p~) . . . . .  I I ' (q  A ~Pn)} ,  
and thus it remains to be shown that I I ' (q  A --1Pi) < [3 for all i, 1 < i < n. 
In fact, since N(pi )  = N ' (p i )  > a i [which follows from the fact that ~- 
satisfies every (pi, Nai)], we have I I ' (~  pi) < 1 - a i. Recall that a i > 1 - 
/3, which shows that I I ' ( -~ Pi) < [3, and therefore I I ' (q  A -1 p )  </3  for all 
i, 1 < i < n. Thus we can conclude that H ' (q )  = I I ' (q  A p~ A ... A pn) > 
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/3. Since I I (q  A Pl A ... A Pn) > II'(q A Pl A "'" A Pn) and {Pl . . . . .  Pn, q} 
p, we know that I I (p )  >_ 13 >__ a.  Thus 7r satisfies (p ,  Ha) .  • 
Before we prove completeness of our method,  we need one more 
definition and a proposit ion. 
DEFINITION 3.4 (Canonical possibility distribution) Let d) be a possi- 
bilistic knowledge base only containing necessity-valued formulas. The 
canonical possibility distribution zr on f~ ± for • is defined by 
7r(to) = 1 - max{a[ (p ,Na)  ~ dp and to ~p},  
where max{ } := O. 
Such a distribution is also called the least specific possibility distribution in 
[31. 
Notice that ~r(to 1) = 1 - max{a[ (p ,  Na)  ~ ~ and to± ~p} = 1 (be- 
cause to± ~p for all p),  which shows that the canonical possibility 
distribution satisfies the normalizat ion constraint. 
PROPOSmON 3.5 Let • be a finite set of necessity-valued formulas, and 
let Ir be the canonical possibility distribution for ~. Then: 
1. 7r(to) <_ 1 - a if (p, Na)  ~ d~ and to~ p. 
2. 7r satisfies ~. 
Proof  1: Let (p ,  Na)  c qb, and let to c I I±  be an interpretation such 
that to ~p.  Then zr(to) = 1 - max{/3 1 (p ,N /3)  ~ • and to ~ep) < 1 - a.  
2: Again, assume that (p ,  Na)~ qb. Since zr(to)_< 1 -a  for every 
interpretat ion to such that to ~ p, we have 
N(p)  = 1 - sup{Tr(to) I to ~ l-l± , to ~p} >_ 1 - (1 - a )  = a ,  
which shows that the canonical possibility distribution satisfies every for- 
mula in q~. • 
LEMMA 3.6 (Completeness for necessity-valued formulas) Let • be a 
possibilistic knowledge base, and let ( p, Na ) be a possibilistic formula with 
o~ > O. If • ~ (p, Na)  then d~, ~ p. 
Proof  Assume that • ~ (p ,  Na)  holds for some ot > 0. To prove the 
claim, we assume to the contrary that ~ g: p holds. The idea is to 
construct a possibility distribution ~r' such that zr' ~ ~ U {(~ p, N1)} and 
zr'(to') > 1 - a for some to' ~ ~,  which implies that Incons(~ U 
{(~p,  N1)}) < N(1 - 7r'(to')) < Na .  This shows that • ~ (p ,  Na)  (Pro- 
position 2.9), which yields a contradiction. 
Let ~ .'= {(q, N/3) ~ ~[ /3  > a}, and let 7r be the canonical possibility 
distribution for • u {(--1 p,  N1)}. The possibility distribution ~-' for q~ U 
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{( ~ p, N1)} is defined as follows: 
{! (w)  if o) l¢~°u  {~p},  ~" (~o)= if w=w l ,  
_ l (a  + 3') otherwise, 
where y = max{/31 (q, N/3) E qb and /3 < a}. Note that y < a,  and there- 
fore 1 - 1 ~(a+ 7)> 1 -  a.  
Now we prove that ~r' satisfies qb U {(-~ p, N1)}, i.e., we show that 
zr' ~ ~b for all 4> • qb U {(~ p, N1)}. 
1. (p ' ,  Nd)  • T U {(-7 p, N1)}. Then 
N(p ' )  = 1 - sup{W(o))  I ~o • ~ l  , ~o ~p '}  
= 1 - sup{ zr (o9) ] o) • ~ l , o) ~e p'} (definition of zr') 
>__ a '  (since zr satisfies (p ' ,Na ' ) ;  cf. Proposit ion 3.5), 
which shows that qr' ~ (p ' ,  Na ' ) .  
2. (p ' ,  Na ' )  • • \ (~  U {(~ p, N1)}). Consider an interpretation oY 
such that w' g:p' .  I f  w' ~ ~0 U {-~p} then zr '(w')  = 1 - ½(a + 3') 
< 1 -  Y, where y=max{/3 l (q ,N /3)•qb  and /3< a}. We show 
that this also holds for w' with w' l~ ~°u  {-Tp}. There is some 
(p", Na")  • • U {( ~ p, N1)} such that oJ ~: p". Since 7r'(o;)  = 7r(w') 
and 7r(w') < 1 - a"  (Proposit ion 3.5), we can conclude that zr'(w') 
_< 1 - a".  Since o~" >_ a > Y, we can conclude that ~-'(w') < 1 - Y. 
Thus we have shown that ~-'(M) < 1 - Y for every w' such that 
w' ~p ' .  Hence we know that N(p ' )  = 1 - sup{W(w) [ oJ • 12 1 , o~ 
p'} > 1 - (1 -  y )= 3'. Since 3 '> a '  [because (p ' ,Na ' )•qb\ (q '  
U {( -1 p,  N1)})], we can conclude that 1r' ~ (p ' ,  Na ' ) .  
3. (q , I ] /3 )  • ~.  Observe that I I (q)  = sup{W(w) lw • 1~± , w ~ q} 
>_ z r ' (w±)  = 1 > /3, which shows that ~ '  ~ (q, I I/3). 
Thus combining cases 1, 2, and 3 shows that ~-' ~ qb u {(-~ p, N1)}. Fur- 
thermore,  the normalizat ion constraint is obviously satisfied, since ~r(w±) 
= 1. To complete the proof  it remains to be shown that zr ' (w')  > 1 - a 
for some w' e 1~. 
Recall that we assumed qb ~ p. Therefore qb U {-~ p} is consistent, 
which means that there is an interpretation w' such that w' ~ qb U { -~ p}. 
According to the definition of 7r' we have zr '(w')  = 1 - ½(a + 7) > 1 - 
a,  and we are done. • 
LEMMA 3.7 (Completeness for possibility-valued formulas) Let cb be a 
possibilistic knowledge base, and let ( p, II a) be a possibilistic formula with 
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a > O. I f  @ ~ (p,  Ha) ,  then @0 ~ p or there is some (q, 1-I/3) • ~ such 
that [3 >_ a and @1-~ U {q) ~p.  
Proof Assume that • ~ (p, I I a )  for some a > 0. If @0 ~p,  we are 
done. Thus assume that q~0 ~: p. We show that there is a formula (q, II/3) 
in @ such that /3 >__ a and @1-~ u (q) ~p.  
Suppose to the contrary that for all (q, II/3) in @ such that /3 >_ a we 
have (I)1 ~ U {qJ ~ p. In the following we construct a possibility distribu- 
tion ~-' such that ~r' satisfies q~ w {(-~p, N1)) and W(to±) < a. But this 
means that Incons(@ U ((-~ p, N1))) < Ha ,  which shows that q~ 
(p, Ha)  (Proposition 2.9), thus contradicting the assumption that • 
(p, Ha)  holds. 
Let ~r be the canonical possibility distribution for {(p ' ,Na' ) l  (p ' ,Na ' )  
• q~} U {(-~ p, N1)}. The possibility distribution ~-' for @ U {(-7 p, N1)} is 
constructed as follows: 
( r r ( to)  if to ~ @0 U {-~p}, 
W(to )= t~(a+Y)  otherwise, if to=to . ,  
where y = max{/31 (r,N/3) • • and /3 < a}. 
We first show that the normalization constraint is satisfied and that 
W(to . )  < a. On the one hand, we assumed that ~0 ~p,  which means 
that there is some interpretation to' such that to' ~ @0 u { --1 p}. Hence we 
have W(to') = 1. On the other hand, we observe that y < a, which means 
that It '(to±) < a. 
Next we prove that ~-' satisfies @ U ((-~ p, N1)), i.e., we show that 
zr' ~ ~b for every 4, • @ u {(-~ p, N1)). 
1. (p ' ,Na ' )  • @ U {(~p,  N1)). Then 
N(p ' )  = 1 - sup(zr'(to) [ to • ~± , to ~ep') 
= 1 - sup{ 7r (to) ] to • 1~ 1 , to ~e p'} (definition of ~-') 
> a' (since ~- satisfies (p' ,  Na ' ) ;  cf. Proposition 3.5), 
which shows that 7r' ~ (p', Na').  
2. (p ' ,Ha ' )  • @ where a' > a. Note that FI(p') = sup{Tr'(to)] to • 
1~ 1 ,  to ~ P'), and thus it suffices to show that there is some to' • 1~ z 
such that to' ~ p' and 7r'(to') > a'. 
Subcase 1: There is an interpretation to' different from to± such that 
to, ~ @0 W {p', -~ p}. Then 7r'(to') = 1 (definition of 7r'), which 
shows that H(p')  > 7r'(to') = 1 > a'. Thus ~r' ~ (p', I Ia ' ) .  
Subcase 2." to ~e qb ° U {p', -n p} for  every interpretation to different from 
to . .  Recall that we assumed that @1-~' w {p ' )~ p. This means 
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that go1-~' u {p', ~ p} is consistent, and hence there is some inter- 
pretation o /~ oJ. such that o /~ gol-~' u (p', -~p}. Since we as- 
sumed that oJ ~ go0 u {p', ~ p} for every interpretation ~o different 
from ~o.,  we can conclude that there is some (p", Na")  ~ go such 
that to' ~ p" and a" _< 1 - a'. 
Since zr'(w') = ~-(to') (definition of ~'), it remains to be shown that 
~-(o/) >_ a'. In fact, 
~(o / )  = 1 - max{/31 (r ,N/3) ~ go u {(-~p,N1)}, o /~ r} 
(definition of ~-) 
= 1 - max{/3[ (r ,N/3) ~ go U {(-~p, N1)}, /3 _< 1 - a' ,  o/ ~er) 
(since o /~ gol-~' U (p', -~ p}) 
>_ a'  (since/3 _< 1 - a ') .  
Thus we have shown that I I (p')  >_ ~-'(o/) = ~(o / )  >_ a' and there- 
fore we can conclude that zr' ~ (p', Ha ' ) .  
3. (p ' , I I a ' )  ~ go where a' < a. Since 1](p') >_ zr'(w±), it suffices to 
show that ~ ' (w~)  >_ a'. In fact, ~-'(o).) = ½(a + 7) >- a'  (because 
7 >- a'  as well as a > a'). 
This shows that ~-' satisfies go U {( ~ p, N1)}, which concludes the proof. 
Lemmas 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, and 3.7 establish the proof for the main result of 
this section: 
THEOREM 3.8 Let go be a possibilistic knowledge base, let p be a 
first-order formula, and let a > O. Then 
• go ~ (p, Na)  iff go~ ~p,  and 
• go ~ (p,  Ha)  iff 
goo ~ p or 
there is some (q, 1]/3) ~ go such that/3 > a and gox ~ U (q} ~ p. 
COROLLARY 3.9 Possibilistic entailment is decidable in those languages in 
which classical entailment is decidable. 
Let us consider some examples. Assume that go is given by 
{(p,N0.8),  (p  ~ q, N0.4), (q ---, r, 110.7)}. 
Since {p, p ~ q, q ~ r} ~ r and min{0.8, 0.4} + 0.7 > 1, we can conclude 
that do entails the possibilistic formula (r, H0.7). 
Now consider go' ;= go U {((q v -~ p) ~ r, N0.5)}. Then go04 = {P, P 
q , (qV  -~p)~r}  ~r  and go0.5 ={P, (qV  ~p)~r}~r ,  which shows 
that go' ~ (r, N0.4) and go' ~ (r, N0.5). 
The following example is concerned with a possibilistic knowledge base 
that demonstrates incompleteness of possibilistic resolution (cf. [15]). Let 
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-'= {(Vx p(x), Ha)}, a > 0, be a possibilistic knowledge base, and let 
p(a) A p(b) be a formula. It can easily be verified that possibilistic resolu- 
tion applied to qb U {(-~p(a)V ~p(b),N1)} allows the derivation of 
exactly the following three formulas: (-~p(a),IIo~),(~p(b),IIa), nd 
([], H0). But this means that possibilistic resolution does not recognize 
that the formula (p(a)Ap(b), I Ia) is entailed by alp. In fact, since 
(~l-a U {Vx p(x)} = {Vx p(x)} ~ p(a) A p(b), we can conclude that (p(a) 
A p(b), Ha)  is a possibilistic onsequence of qb. 
In the rest of this section we consider the problem of how to determine 
(with the help of Theorem 3.8) the inconsistency degree of a possibilistic 
knowledge base qb. By Proposition 2.9 we know that • ~ (& ,v) iff 
Incons(dp U {(7 ± ,N1)}) >_ v, and hence qb ~ (± ,v) iff Incons(dP) >_ v, 
where _L is an inconsistent formula and v is a necessity or possibility 
measure. Thus the problem is to find the maximal value v (w.r.t. the 
ordering of Definition 2.8) such that qb ~ (± , v). 
Let y := min{al(p, Na) ~ qb}. First assume that qb ~ ±.  This means 
that qb is necessarily inconsistent at least to degree % Observe that 
~ _ qb, iff a < a'. Hence, in order to determine the number a ~ {/3 [ 
(p, N/3) ~ ~) such that ~ ~ ± but q~" ~ ± , one can for instance apply 
a binary search algorithm [rather than testing for each element a ~ (a[ 
(p, Na)  ~ qb} whether or not q~ is inconsistent]. The inconsistency degree 
of ~ is then given by Na. 
Now assume that qb ~e ± . If d~ 1-¢ U {q} is consistent for every (q, 1-[/3) 
in qb, we can conclude that qb is completely consistent [which means that 
Incons(dP) = 170]. Otherwise, the maximal number/3 such that (q, II/3) 
and q~l-¢ U {q} is inconsistent yields the inconsistency degree of ~, i.e., 
Incons(~) = II/3. It should be noted that if (q, 17/3) and (q', II/3') are in 
and /3 </3',  in general neither Th({q} u ~a-~) c Th({q'} U qb 1-~') nor 
Th({q} U ~1-~) ~ Th({q'} U ~1-~') holds, where Th(F) := {qlF ~ q} 
stands for the deductive closure of a set of formulas F. This, however, 
means that one cannot employ binary search to determine the required 
value /3. 
To sum up, assume that qb is a possibilistic knowledge base with n 
formulas and p is a first-order formula. Then we can determine the 
maximal number a such that qb ~ (p, Na)  with O(log n) classical entail- 
ment tests. In contrast o this, one can determine with O(n) entailment 
tests the maximal number ~ such that • ~ (p, 17o~). 
4. A POSSIBILISTIC EXTENSION OF TERMINOLOGICAL LOGICS 
This section describes an extension of terminological knowledge repre- 
sentation formalisms that handles uncertain knowledge and allows for 
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approximate reasoning. This approach is not only satisfactory from a 
semantical point of view; it also provides sound and complete decision 
procedures for the basic inference problems. These algorithms can imme- 
diately be obtained by instantiating our proof method with the well-known 
inference algorithms for terminological logics. 
4.1 Terminological Knowledge Representation 
In the following we briefly introduce a particular terminological formal- 
ism, called ALCN (cf. [12]). Such a formalism can be used to define the 
relevant concepts of a problem domain. Relationships between concepts, 
for instance inclusion or disjointness axioms, can be expressed in the 
terminological part. The assertional part allows one to describe objects of 
the problem domain with respect o their relation to concepts and their 
interrelation with each other. 
We assume two disjoint alphabets of symbols, called primitive concepts 
and roles. The set of concepts is inductively defined as follows. Every 
primitive concept is a concept. Now let C, D be concepts already defined, 
and let R be a role. Then C lq D (conjunction), C U D (disjunction), -7 C 
(negation), VR.C (value restriction), 3R.C (exists restriction), and (> n R) 
and (< n R) (number estrictions) are concepts of the language ALCN. 
Concepts are usually interpreted as subsets of a domain, and roles as 
binary relations over a domain. This means that primitive concepts (re- 
spectively, roles) are considered as symbols for unary (respectively, binary) 
predicates, and that concepts correspond to formulas with one free vari- 
able. Thus primitive concepts A and roles R are translated into atomic 
formulas A(x)  and R(x, y), where x, y are free variables. The semantics 
of the concept-forming constructs i given by 
(C R D) (x )  = C(x)  A D(x) ,  
(C U D) (x )  = C(x)  v D(x) ,  
(-7 C) (x )  = -7 C(x ) ,  
(VR.C) (x)  = Vy(R(x ,  y) ~ C(y)) ,  
(3R .C) (x )  = 3y(R(x ,  y) A C(y)) ,  
( > nR) (x )  = 3y I . . . . .  Y,, Yl ~ Y2 A Yl --/:Y3 A "" A yn_ 1 4~y,, 
AR(X,  Yl) A "" A R(x,  y~), 
(< nR) (x )  = Vy 1 . . . . .  Y~+1 R(x ,  Yl) A ... A R(x,y~+ 1) 
-'+Yl =Y2 Vyl =Y3 V "" Vyn+ 1 =Yn" 
It should be noted that the formulas thus obtained belong to a restricted 
subclass of all first-order formulas with one free variable. 
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A terminological knowledge base is described by a set of inclusion 
axioms and- - to  introduce objects with respect o their relation to concepts 
and their interrelation with each others- -a  set of membership assertions. 
To be more formal, let C, D be concepts, let R be a role, and let a, b 
be names for individuals, so-called objects. A terminological axiom is of the 
form 
C~D,  
and expresses that every instance of C is also an instance of D. To state 
that an object a belongs to a concept C, or that two objects a, b are 
related by a role R, one can use assertions having the form 
a:C or (a,b):R. 
The semantics of a terminological xiom C ~ D is given by the formula 
Vx C(x) ~ D(x), where C(x), D(x) are the first-order formulas corre- 
sponding to the concepts C, D. To define the semantics of assertions we 
consider individual names as symbols for constants. In terminological 
systems one usually has a unique-name assumption, which can be expressed 
by the formulas a ~ b for all distinct individual names a, b. The formula 
corresponding to the assertion a : C [to (a, b) : R] is obtained by replacing 
the free variable(s) in the formula corresponding to C [to R] with a [with 
a,b]. 
A terminological knowledge base is a pair ( J ,  d )  where J is a finite set of 
terminological axioms (the so-called TBox) and a¢ is a finite set of 
assertions (the so-called ABox). Observe that a terminological knowledge 
base (3, a¢) can be viewed as a finite set of first-order formulas that can be 
obtained by taking the translations of the TBox and ABox facts and the 
formulas expressing the unique-name assumption. 
The basic inference services for terminological knowledge bases are 
defined as follows: 
Consistency hecking. Does there exist a model for a given terminologi- 
cal knowledge base (J,, ~')? 
Subsumption problem. Is a terminological axiom C ~ D entailed by 
( Jd ) ,  i.e., (~ ,~)  ~ VxC(x) ~ D(x)? 
Instantiationproblem. Is an assertion a : C (a, b) : R entailed by (J,~¢), 
i.e., (J,, ~¢') ~ a:C [(J,,~¢) ~ (a,b):R]? 
It should be noted that these inference problems are decidable for 
most terminological logics. 
4.2 The Possibilistic Extension 
The possibilistic extension of the terminological formalism introduced in 
the previous ubsection is obtained as follows: Each terminological xiom 
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(respectively, assertion) is equipped with a possibility or a necessity value 
and will be called a possibilistic terminological xiom (a possibilistic asser- 
tion). A possibilistic knowledge base is now a set of possibilistic terminologi- 
cal axioms together with a set of possibilistic assertions. 
In order to give some impression on the expressivity of the extended 
terminological language, let us consider two examples. The first one, which 
is taken from [23], is concerned with strict terminological axioms but 
uncertain assertions. Assume that 3-is given by 
(Father  ~ Man m ( >_ 1 chi ld) ,  N1), 
(Success fu l _ fa ther  ~ Father m Vchi ld .Col lege_graduate,  N1), 
where (C ~ D, N1) is an abbreviation for the axioms (C ~ D, N1) and 
(D ~ C, N1). The first axiom expresses that someone is a father iff he is a 
man and has some child; the latter one states that someone is a successful 
father iff he is a father and all his children are college graduates. 
First consider the (certain) assertions 
d = {( John  : Man ~ ( <_ 2 chi ld) ,  N1), 
( ( John ,  Phi l ip) : chi ld, N1), 
(Ph i l ip :  Col lege_graduate,  N1), 
( ( John ,  Ange la)  : chi ld, N1), 
( Angela  : Col lege_graduate,  N1)}, 
which state that John is a man having at most two children, that Philip and 
Angela are children of John, and that both are college graduates. Since 
Philip and Angela are the only children of John (because he has at most 
two children) and both children are college graduates, we can conclude 
that John is a successful father, i.e., the possibilistic assertion (John : Suc- 
cessful_father, N1) is entailed by (J,, d) .  
Now assume that it is only likely that Philip is a college graduate, which 
can be encoded by (Philip:College_graduate, N0.8). Again, by possi- 
bilistic entailment we conclude that John is a successful father but, of 
course, only with a necessity degree of 0.8. 
In the second example, possibility and necessity degrees are utilized to 
express plausible rules. Assume that the TBox 3-contains the following 
possibilistic axioms: 
(3 owns.  Porsche -~ R ich_person u Car_ fanatic,  N0.8), 
(R ich_person  -+ Golfer,  1-[0.7). 
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The first axiom expresses that it is rather certain that someone is either 
rich or a car fanatic is (s)he owns a Porsche. The second one states that 
rich persons are possibly golfers. 
The assertional knowledge is given by the facts that Tom owns a Porsche 
911 and that he is probably not a car fanatic, i.e., 
= {((Tom, 911) : owns,  N1), 
(911 : Porsche, N1), 
(Tom : -~ Car_fanatic, N0.7)}. 
We are interested in the question of whether or not Tom is a golfer. To 
answer the query observe that 
{(Tom, 911)  : owns,  911 : Porsche} ~ Tom : 3owns.Porsche,  
which shows that (Tom : 3 owns.Porsche, N1) is entailed by (3,, d) .  Hence, 
it can easily be verified that (J,,5~') 1-°'7 u {Rich_person --* Golfer} 
Tom: Golfer. This shows that (Tom: Golfer, 110.7) is a possibilistic onse- 
quence of (J,, ~'), which means that we have some reasons to believe that 
Tom is a golfer. 
The following proposition shows that possibilistic reasoning restricted to 
the introduced terminological formalism is decidable. This result is an 
immediate consequence of Theorem 3.8 and the fact that the instantiation 
problem in ALCN knowledge bases is decidable (cf. [5, 1]). 
PROPOSITION 4.1 Let J be a finite set of possibilistic axioms, and let ~ be 
a finite set of possibilistic assertions. It is decidable whether or not a 
possibilistic axiom (or a possibilistic assertion) is entailed by (Y,, ~¢). 
Almost all terminological systems do not allow arbitrary TBoxes, but 
only those that satisfy certain conditions (for instance, the left-hand side of 
an axiom must be a primitive concept, and a primitive concept may appear 
at most once at the left-hand side of an axiom). In [11, Chapter 7.3] it has 
been shown how to obtain more efficient inference procedures if possibilis- 
tic TBoxes satisfy the additional restrictions. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have developed an alternative proof method for possibilistic logic 
which exploits the fact that possibilistic reasoning can be reduced to 
reasoning in classical, i.e. first-order, logic. Consequently, possibilistic 
reasoning is decidable for a fragment of first-order logic iff classical 
entailment is decidable for it. Moreover, if one has an algorithm solving 
the entailment problem, our method automatically ields an algorithm 
realizing possibilistic entailment which is sound and complete with respect 
to the semantics for possibilistic logic. 
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Furthermore, we have instantiated possibilistic logic with a terminologi- 
cal logic, which is a decidable fragment of first-order logic, but neverthe- 
less much more expressive than propositional logic. This leads to an 
extension of terminological logics towards the representation f uncertain 
knowledge which is-- in contrast o other approaches--satisfactory from a 
semantic point of view. Moreover, a sound and complete algorithm for 
possibilistic entailment in such an extension can be obtained by using 
inference procedures which have already been developed for terminologi- 
cal logics. 
An interesting point for further research is to employ possibilistic logic 
in order to represent and reason with defaults in terminological for- 
malisms. In fact, in [9, 3] it has been argued that possibilistic logic yields a 
good basis for nonmonotonic reasoning. Roughly speaking, the idea is as 
follows: If the necessity of a formula p is greater than the necessity of ~ p 
with respect o a set q~ of necessity-valued formulas, then infer nonmono- 
tonically p from ~. This intuitive definition in fact characterizes an 
appropriate nonmonotonic consequence r lation, as (1) the operator can 
be described in terms of preferential models, and (2) most of the axioms 
which a nonmonotonic operator should satisfy are met (see [9] on these 
points). The approach presented in [3], however, uses propositional logic 
and cannot directly be applied to the terminological case. One reason for 
this is that terminological default rules usually allow one to state that "C's 
are normally D's" where C, D are concepts, i.e., first-order formulas with 
one free variable. 
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